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Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the
Former Yugoslavia: The Case for an
International War Crimes Tribunal
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER7
I. INTRODUCTION
War is an evil phenomenon. Its consequences reach far beyond the
armed forces and borders of the belligerent parties involved. The trag-
edy and suffering of these realities are amply exemplified today in the
pervasive regional violence that has followed the political disintegra-
tion of the former Yugoslavia into Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (comprised
of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro).
Ongoing armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since June 1991 have produced numerous allegations of grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international hu-
manitarian law.' These charges, which have been leveled primarily
* Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington
University. Ph.D., Foreign Affairs, 1977, University of Virginia; M.A, Government,
1973; MA4., International Affairs, 1972; B-A., International Relations, 1970, Florida
State University. The author would like to thank Mr. Paul Szasz and Mr. Richard
Rodero for their valuable assistance in securing documentary materials in the course
of research for this article.
1. A considerable number of reports containing allegations of grave breaches of
international humanitarian law have been submitted to the special Commission of
Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). Governments
issuing reports included Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Germany,
Norway, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United States and Yugoslavia. Reports from United
Nations agencies and authorities directly concerned with the humanitarian situation
include those of the Special Rapporteur appointed under resolution 1992/S-I1l of the
Commission on Human Rights to investigate first hand the human rights situation
in the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Human Rights Committee and the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe has submitted several reports, including its report on the
CSCE Mission to detention camps in Bosnia, the report of CSCE Human Rights
Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia, and the Report of the Mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina and to Croatia under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism of the
CSCE. Finally, reports have also been prepared by several nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), many of which contain detailed information about grave breaches
and other violations of humanitarian law. Among these NGOs are Amnesty Interne-
tional, International Committee of the Red Cross, Medecins sans frontieres, Helsinki
Watch, International League for Human Rights, Union for Peace and Humanitarian
Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina and World Campaign to Save Humanity.' See Letter
dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR,48th Year, Annex I, at 7-8 (Jan. 26, 1993), U.N. DOC.
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against the government and armed forces of Serbia, are starkly remi-
niscent of charges made during the Nuremberg trials against major
German war criminals, i.e., war crimes, crimes against the peace, and
crimes against humanity." Typifying these crimes in the Yugoslavian
situation is the genocidal practice of "ethnic cleansing," by which mass
numbers of Bosnian Muslims have been systematically driven from
their homes, incarcerated in concentration camps, tortured, raped, and
murdered.! While violations of the laws of war no doubt have occurred
on all sides, it is the horrendous atrocities by Serbian forces associated
with ethnic cleansing that have propelled international humanitarian
concern to the forefront of these conflicts.
On May 25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council approved the estab-
lishment of a special international tribunal for the prosecution of per-
sons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."
War crimes trial proceedings are therefore likely to be brought against
certain persons in Yugoslavia's successor governments and their armed
forces, as well as civilians. This article aims to accomplish three pur-
poses: First, it examines the legal scope and juridical underpinnings
for those criminal proceedings as fixed in the Nuremberg Precedent
(i.e., the principles of international humanitarian law that were formu-
lated and carried out by the Nuremberg Tribunal). In this way, the
range of relevant law can be weighed within the context of humani-
tarian considerations. Second, it analyzes the nature and scope of re-
S/25274 (1993) [hereinafter Commission of Experts Report]. See also Theodor Meron,
The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFr., Summer 1993, at 122.
2. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Prose-
cution of State-Sponsored Mass Murder, 11 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INTL & COMP. L. 325
(1990); Steven Fogelson, Nuremberg Legacy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 870 (1990); and
ROBERT JACKSON THE NUREMBERG CASE (1947).
3. In his third report to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council, the
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights defined the odious notion of "ethnic cleansing"
as "the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of
members of other ethnic groups." Report on the situation of human rights in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Com-
mission resolution 1992/S-11 and Economic and Social Council decision 1992/305, in
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of the Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item
97(c), U.N. DOC. A/47/666, S/24809 (1992). "Ethnic cleansing" involves violations of
international humanitarian law because of the intentional methods used in its perpe-
tration, which include, inter alia, threats, harassment, and intimidation; shooting or
using explosives against homes, shops, and places of business; destruction of places
of worship and cultural institutions; forcible transfer and relocation of populations;
summary executions; committing torture, rape, and mutilation of corpses; disregard
for the sick and injured; and targeting areas of civilian activity or residence. Id. See
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 110, 116-21.
4. U.N. DOC. S/RES/827 (1993).
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ported ongoing violations of humanitarian law in Bosnia to determine
whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed with international mea-
sures to remedy the situation. Third, the article assesses the progres-
sive efforts by the international community, particularly through the
United Nations, to halt atrocities being perpetrated in Bosnia and to
move toward a special war crimes tribunal for prosecuting alleged
perpetrators. The intent here is neither to accuse nor indict; rather, it
is to evaluate the prospects for and direction of such war criminal
proceedings. Finally, it examines some realistic conclusions about the
feasibility of applying the Nuremberg Precedent further in the so-
called New World Order.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE NUREMBERG PRECEDENT
The horrendous violations of the laws of war by the Axis powers
during World War II prompted demands for effective postwar punish-
ment of those individuals responsible. On August 8, 1945, the govern-
ments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union concluded in London the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European War Axis."
This instrument contained details of and the Charter for the establish-
ment of an International Military Tribunal.'
The Nuremberg Tribunal marked the first time that adjudication
was convened pursuant to an international prescription defining par-
ticular crimes liable for prosecution. The fact that German high offi-
cials were given fair trials in itself was no small achievement, as it
demonstrated respect for the law contained in that Charter. That re-
spect was further evidenced by the establishment of the International
Military Tribunal for the just and prompt trial of alleged war crimi-
nals.7
Key among the Nuremberg Charter's central provisions was Arti-
cle 6, which defined the jurisdiction of the court:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:
(a) Crimes against the Peace: Namely, planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
5. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Mqjor War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. [hereinafter London Charter]. See also 13 DEPT OF STATE BULL 222
(1945).
6. 13 DEP'T OF STATE BuLL, supra note 5, at 223.
7. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg 40 Years After: An Introduc-
tion, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 261 (1986).
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foregoing;
(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but shall not be limited to, mur-
der, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or from any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, town or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population before or during the war, or per-
secutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan .... 
The body of modern international humanitarian law has been
constructed on this foundation of criminal jurisdiction. Regarding
crimes against the peace, contemporary international law clearly as-
serts that launching and waging a war of aggression is unlawful. The
critical point here turns on the presumption that individual responsi-
bility is paramount. Planning, preparing, and carrying out a war of
aggression is done by people in one state against the people in some
other state. Crimes against international law are committed by per-
sons, not by abstract polities called states. Only by punishing individu-
als who commit such crimes can tenets of international humanitarian
law actually be enforced.
War crimes are multiple in character and are defined as acts that
violate the law of armed conflict - i.e., the rules established by cus-
tomary law and conventional international law regulating the conduct
of warfare and that have been designated as war crimes.9 It is impor-
8. London Charter, supra note 5, art. VI.
9. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, NWP 9 (REV.A/FMFM 1-10) 6-27 (1989). The following acts are consid-
ered representative of war crimes: (1) Offenses against prisoners of war, including
killing without just cause, torture or inhuman treatment; unhealthy, dangerous, or
otherwise prohibited labor; infringement of religious rights; and denial of fair trial
for offenses; (2) offenses against civilian inhabitants of occupied territory, including
killing without just cause, torture or inhuman treatment, forced labor, deportation,
infringement of religious rights, and denial of fair trial for offenses; (3) offenses
against the sick and wounded, including killing, wounding, or mistreating enemy
forces disabled by sickness or wounds; (4) denial of quarter (i.e., denial of the clem-
ency of not killing a defeated enemy) and offenses against combatants who have laid
down their arms and have surrendered; (5) offenses against the survivors of ships
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tant to realize that the laws of war embody rules of international law
with which belligerents have agreed to comply should hostilities break
out. Such laws involve specified mutual legal obligations and duties
pertaining to warfare. The right of a belligerent to punish persons who
violate the laws and customs of war as war criminals is a well-recog-
nized principle of international law.
War crimes must be distinguished from "crimes against the peace"
and "crimes against humanity." While the distinction between crimes
against the peace and war crimes is not overly difficult, the distinction
between war crimes and crimes against humanity appears more prob-
lematic. In general, crimes against humanity constitute offenses
against the human rights of individuals perpetrated in a pervasive,
systematic manner. Isolated offenses are excluded from crimes against
humanity, and proof must confirm that acts alleged to be crimes
against humanity resulted from premeditated, systematic governmen-
tal policies. 0 Significantly, acts constituting war crimes may be com-
mitted by members of the armed forces of belligerent states or by indi-
viduals belonging to the civilian population."
Crimes against humanity come in two general varieties. One con-
cerns the execution type of crime, which includes acts such as murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation and the like. The second per-
tains to the persecution type of crimes, which include acts committed
on racial, religious, or political grounds. Both groups of crimes against
humanity are committed against civilian populations. In this connec-
tion, isolated offenses fall outside the scope of crimes against humani-
ty. Authoritative, systematic, mass action is necessary to pervert the
common crime, punishable solely under municipal law, into a crime
against humanity that generates the concern of international law.
Such crimes by their sheer magnitude and savagery shock the con-
science of humankind.'
and aircraft lost at seas, including killing, wounding, or mistreating the shipwrecked;
and failing to provide for the safety of survivors as military circumstances permit;
(6) wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages or devastation not justified by
the requirements of military operations; and bombardment, the sole purpose of which
is to attack and terrorize the civilian population; (7) deliberate attack upon medical
facilities, hospital ships, medical aircraft, medical vehicles or medical personnel; (8)
plunder and pillage of public or private property; (9) mutilation or other mistreat-
ment of the dead; (10) use of prohibited arms or ammunition; (11) misuse, abuse, or
firing on flags of truce or on the Red Cross device, and similar protective emblems,
signs, and signals; (12) treacherous request for quarter (i.e., feigning surrender in
order to gain a military advantage). Id. at 6-32-6-34.
10. Id. at 6-28. Victims of crimes against humanity encompass a wider range of
persons than those who might be made the objects of war crimes. In addition, vic-
tims may include nationals of the state committing the offense, as well as stateless
persons. Id.
11. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 1, at 16.
12. See generally W.J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NuREMBERG: AMERICAN ATrITUDES
TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR CRIME TRIALS (1970); CHARLES W. ALEXANDER &
1994
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A cardinal principle emerging from the Nuremberg Precedent
asserts that the rights of humanity should prevail over the province of
municipal law. In a real sense, crimes against humanity have been
made liable to prosecution through an international tribunal because
the heinous nature of those crimes offends humanity itself." Simi-
larly, such crimes can be reasonably viewed as threats to world peace
since their ramifications might well give rise to transnational conflict.
As a consequence, the precept that crimes against humanity--given
that they so egregiously contravene standards of civilized na-
tions--could be made subject to the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal furnished a notably progressive development toward the codi-
fication of international humanitarian law.14
A second core principle stemming from the Nuremberg Precedent
holds that individuals have international duties that go beyond na-
tional obligations set by domestic governments.' Irrespective of
whether an individual is a private citizen or government official, that
person is subject to punishment under international law."6 To be sure,
this principle poses challenges for the state centric system in at least
two ways. First, if a state's nationals are accused of war crimes, that
state may be bound to relinquish jurisdiction over them to internation-
al jurisdiction. 7 As a second and resultant corollary, the state's sover-
eignty is made more circumscribed by the demands of international
law.' The use of force by governments within states, as well as that
between them, has now become subject to centralized international
legal control. The international community has clearly come to accept
a special legal regime for governing the actions of states and individu-
als during armed conflict."9 Nuremberg represented an early effort at
conscientiously designing the procedures and norms of this regime.
ANNE KEESHAN, JuSICE AT NuRMBERG (1946); and ROBERT K. WOETLEL, THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1962).
13. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2556 (1991). See also Whitney K.
Harris, A Call for An International War Crimes Court: Learning from Nuremberg, 23
U. TOL. L. REv. 229, 243 (1992).
14. See generally Louis Rene Beres, The United States Should Take the Lead in
Preparing International Legal Machinery for the Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA.
J. INT'L L. 381 (1991).
15. Matthew Lippman, Civil Resistance: The Dictates of Conscience and Interna-
tional Law Versus the American Judiciary, 6 FLA. J. INTL L. 5, 32 (1991).
16. Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 833, 870 (1990). See also Principles of International Cooperation in the Detec-
tion, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G. Res. 3074, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
17. Measures to Deal with International Crimes, in UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS IN
THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244 (1983).
18. RICHARD FALc, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 159 (1968).
19. See generally JEAN PICTET, DEVEWDMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (1985) and JEAN PICTET, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN-
ITARIAN LAw (1988).
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Related to individual duty and war crimes are the twin concepts
of command responsibility and superior orders. The Nuremberg experi-
ence firmly established the principle that a person who gives an order
to commit a war crime against humanity and the person who carries it
out are equally guilty of the offense. In fact, a responsible commander
could be subject to trial even if he did not order such crimes but knew
or should have known of the unlawful conduct and failed to take rea-
sonable actions to prevent, suppress, and punish it.' This principle
applies both to military superiors of regular or irregular armed forces
and to civilian authorities. Similarly, the fact that an individual com-
mits a war crime under orders from his military or civilian superior
does not relieve him of responsibility under international law. Respon-
sibility is established when the order given is manifestly unlawful and
the person receiving the order knows (or should know) of its unlawful
character under international law."
A third principle associated with the Nuremberg Precedent is
contained in the definition of war crimes as it prohibits the wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages. The Nuremberg definition es-
sentially mandates that violence and devastation of civilian areas not
justified by military necessity are forbidden.' To be sure, the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal went to great lengths to demonstrate that ac-
tions producing unnecessary damage and destruction were already war
crimes, and were therefore unlawful. The Tribunal eventually held
liable those persons who intended to perform such unlawful acts.'
The normative implications of the Nuremberg Precedent are real
and profound. The Tribunal at Nuremberg embodied the international
community's resolve to ensure that persons responsible for heinous
acts systematically perpetrated as part of a mass campaign of discrimi-
nation and persecution must not go unpunished. Such a conviction has
roots in the 1907 Hague Convention, which refers to the laws of hu-
manity as principles governing the conduct of international war." A
20. See The High Command Case (The Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb), 12 L Rep. of
Trials of War Criminals 1, 71 (1949). See generally William Hayes Parks, Command
Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL L REV. 1 (1973).
21. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 9, at 6-39.
A situation involving superior orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment,
however. Id. See generally L.C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (1976).
22. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Individual Responsibility in Warfare, in LAW AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE 194, 195 (Peter D. Trooboff ed., 1975).
23. Id. at 207-208.
24. Hague Convention No. 1V Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]. The
famous de Martens. clause in the Preamble to this instrument makes clear the
broad, evolutionary scope for the positive the law of war. It provides that
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
High Contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
1994
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critical theme for the viability of international humanitarian law con-
sequently emerges: emphasis on the permissibility of international
jurisdiction underscores the firm insistence of international law that
these crimes not go unpunished.'
The Nuremberg Tribunal represented the first major attempt to
use the rule of law to protect the rights of all persons and foster a
more peaceful, humane, and secure world.' That experience also con-
tributed significantly in propelling the drafting of the four 1949 Gene-
va Conventions.' Especially salient is Article 3, common to each of
these conventions, that guarantees humane treatment for persons
taking no active part in the hostilities. This provision stipulates that
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, with-
out any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited
at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humili-
ating and degrading treatment;
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of principles of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of
the public conscience.
Id. at Preamble.
25. The case for international jurisdiction over violations of international humani-
tarian law is facilitated by the permissible application of universal jurisdiction to
such offenders. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAw
AND PRACTICE (vol. II, ch. 6, 1983); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNrrED STATES, §§ 402-404 (1987).
26. Lippman, supra note 15, at 48.
27. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. No. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1949 Gene-
va Conventions].
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(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of exe-
cutions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly con-
stituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be cared for. An impartial
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other
provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict."
The decision to try the crimes set out in the Nuremberg Charter
grew out of its reliance on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced
war as an instrument of national policy." Also, carrying out the
Nuremberg Charter's mandate clearly necessitated difficult legal judg-
ments, especially concerning legal questions of precedent, jurisdiction,
and scope. Once made, however, these legal judgments formed the bed-
rock on which modern international humanitarian law is grounded.'
28. Id. art. 3.
29. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. As assert-
ed in Article I of this instrument, "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the
solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another." Id. art. I.
30. On November 21, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Reso-
lution 177 (II), which affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." As subse-
quently formulated by the U.N. International Law Commission, the text of these
principles are as follows:
Principle I. Any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to pun-
ishment.
Principle I. The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty
for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not
relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under
international law.
Principle IlI. The fact that a person who committed an act which
constitutes a crime under international law acted as a Head of State or
responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law.
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to
him.
Principle V. Any person charged with a crime under international
law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
Principle VI. The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as
crimes under international law: (crimes against the peace, war crimes
and crimes against humanity are thereafter defined substantially as they
appear in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg].
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It is this same humanitarian law that must be applied to the armed
conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
III. NUREMBERG AND THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The war in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, remains a violent armed conflict that has generated seri-
ous political, military, and legal implications throughout the interna-
tional community. In the process, the tragedy of that war proffers the
first realistic opportunity since the Nuremberg experience to prosecute
persons responsible for committing grave breaches of international
humanitarian law."1
A. The Legal Issues
1. International Humanitarian Law
The armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has
generated a number of legal issues involving facets of "international
humanitarian law." But how is international humanitarian law to be
defined? As applied to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, such law gen-
erally refers to the "rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict." 2 Some of these rules are set out in the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conven-
tions," to which the former Yugoslavia was a party. The Federal Re-
Principle Vfl. Complicity in the commission of a crime against the
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Prin-
ciple VI is a crime under international law.
Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session, U.N.
GAOR, 5th sess., pt. 1, Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316, at 11-14 (1950).
31. At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in early 1991 serious suggestions
were made that war crimes trials of Iraqi soldiers and governmental officials were
in order, but neither formal proceedings nor a tribunal was ever promulgated. For
discussion of the prospects of Iraqi war crimes, see Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam:
Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. bWL L. 351 (1991);
Beres, supra note 14; and John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in
the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J. INTL L. 403 (1991).
32. Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating
to the Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflict, art. 2, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1399 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]. For the fundamental
principles of modern humanitarian law, see Lippman supra note 15. For a general
discussion of international humanitarian law, see PICTET, supra note 19.
33. For the Geneva Conventions, see note 27 supra. In Protocol I, specific provi-
sions of humanitarian law are contained in two categories of acts designated as
"grave breaches' of that instrument. The first category requires that both willfulness
and death or serious injury to body or health be caused, and includes the following
acts as grave breaches:
(a) making the civilian population or individual citizens the object
of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian popu-
lation or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause
extensive loss of life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian ob-
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public of Yugoslavia, said to be the successor to that state, is bound by
these treaties." Also legally significant, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina have declared themselves likewise bound.'
Other international instruments also hold specific relevance to the
situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, given that the vio-
lence there has risen to the level of an armed conflict. International
agreements that specifically relate to the conduct of hostilities and the
treatment of local persons include the 1907 Hague Convention IV and
jects.... ;
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing
dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause extensive
loss of life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects .... ;
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the
object of attack;
,(e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he
is hors de combat;
(f) the perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive
emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun, or other
protective sign recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol.
Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 85(3). A second category of grave breaches contained
in Protocol I requires only willfulness to be an offense and includes the following:
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civil-
ian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or trans-
fer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or
outside this territory, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Conven-
tion;
(b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or
civilians;
(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading prac-
tices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial dis-
crimination;
(d) making the clearly recognized historic monuments, works of
- art or places or worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heri-
tage of peoples and to which special protection has been given by spe-
cial arrangement ... the object of attack, causing as a result extensive
destruction thereof ... ; and
(e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to
in paragraph 2 of this article of the rights of fair and regular trial.
Id. art. 85(4).
34. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 1, at 13.
35. In the 1992 Programme of Action concluded at the London International Con-
ference, these governments pledged to abide by the provision that "all parties to the
[Yugoslav] conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under the Internation-
al Humanitarian Law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
Additional Protocols thereto, and that persons who commit or order the commission
of grave breaches are individually responsible.* United Nations, General Assembly,
Security Council, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia; Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992,
48th Sess., Annex III, U.N. Doc. A/48 - S/25341 at 78 (1992) [hereinafter 1992
Programme of Action].
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the Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land;" the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide;" the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict;' and the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
may be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, and Protocols.' Relevant human rights laws are also applica-
ble to this conflict in the Balkans.'
2. Legal Status of the Conflict
Another legal consideration is the status of the conflict. Do the
various armed conflicts occurring in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia qualify as international armed conflicts entailing belligerent
hostilities between two or more states? Or do they more closely resem-
ble non-international (i.e., internal) armed conflicts taking place within
the territory of a single state?
The character and complexity of the regional situation make such
a determination difficult at best. At times, armed conflict has occurred
involving the armed forces of one state in the territory of another
state. But at many other times, indigenous ethnic groups (primarily
Serbs) have operated as irregular guerrilla forces against other ethnic
groups (primarily Muslims) within the territory of a single state
(mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina). The status of the conflict is relevant
since it may determine which treaties apply to what circumstances,
when and where. No easy solution is available. It is important to re-
alize, however, that both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1954
Hague Convention present the opportunity for parties involved in an
internal armed conflict to negotiate special arrangements that would
36. Hague Convention lV, supra note 24.
37. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. For discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, The
United States and the Genocide Convention, 27 IND. ImL & CoMp. L. Rev. 441 (1987).
38. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240-88.
39. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 95/15 and Corr. 1 - 5 (1980).
40. Among the human rights instruments offering protection to persons affected
by the armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 and 1967 Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 18, 1966, 606 U.N.T.S. 268, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.IA.S. 6577; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, GA. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46 at
193 (1979); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, GA Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
51, at 197 (1984); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 LL.M. 352; International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA Res. 2200 (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. DOC. A/6316 (1967); and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, GA. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. DOC. A/6316 (1967).
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permit all or part of these conventions to be activated."' The parties
involved in these armed conflicts in the Balkans have concluded such a
series of special agreements."
Considering the shifting character and complicated nature of the
situation - as well as the agreements made among the respective gov-
ernments on humanitarian issues - the most appropriate approach
would seem to be to apply the law for international armed conflicts to
all warfare in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Greater legal pro-
tection under the laws relating to armed conflict would be afforded to
more persons in all the afflicted states without the complications of
reviewing each incident of violence to determine if it qualified for na-
tional or international status. Potential excuses premised on national
sovereignty would be subsumed to legal conditions implicating interna-
tional responsibility.
3. Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law
a. Background
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia began shortly after Croatia and
Slovenia formally declared their independence on June 25, 1991.' In
Croatia, fighting broke out between Croats and ethnic Serbs. Serbia
sent arms and supplies to ethnic Serbian rebels in Croatia, leading to
numerous clashes between Croatian forces and Yugoslavian army units
with their Serbian supporters."
On October 15, 1991, the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopt-
ed a declaration of sovereignty' and on February 29, 1992 a referen-
dum for independence was passed.' Indigenous Serbs, who account
for some thirty one percent of Bosnia's population and who opposed the
referendum, immediately launched attacks aimed at seizing Bosnian
territory and dissuading the international community from recognizing
the independence of the new state.'7 The republics of Serbia and
Montenegro proclaimed a new "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" on
April 17, 1992.' Fierce fighting persisted throughout Bosnia-
41. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3; Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 38, art. 19.
42. 1992 Programme of Action, supra note 35.
43. See Chuck Sudetic, 2 Yugoslav States Vote Independence to Press Demands,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at Al; Chuck Sudetic, Croatia Says Call-Up is Next
Move, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1991, at AS.
44. More Yugoslavs Roll Into Croatia; Civilian Leader Ponders His Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1991, at A3.
45. Francis X. Clines, Serbia and Croatia Agree to Another Cease-Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A10.
46. Chuck Sudetic, Turnout in Bosnia Signals Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1992, at A3.
47. Chuck Sudetic, Rebel Serbs Disrupt Travel Into Yugoslavia Republic, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. .3, 1992, at A9.
48. John F. Burns, Confirming Split, Last 2 Republics Proclaim a Small New
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Herzegovina during the spring and the summer of 1992, as Serbs mas-
sacred thousands of Bosnians, many of them civilians. Throughout the
conflict, Serbia continued to furnish arms and military supplies to
ethnic Serb guerrillas fighting in Bosnia.
In February 1992, the United Nations Security Council responded
to the situation by adopting Resolution 721 (1992), which authorized
sending a special peacekeeping force, the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR), to Bosnia." In mid-1994, UNPROFOR remained
in place, comprised of some 23,200 troops, mostly from France and
Great Britain.
b. Commission on Human Rights
The violence in Bosnia and Croatia has escalated to the level of a
full-scale regional conflict, bringing with it widespread violations of
international humanitarian law, euphemistically described as "ethnic
cleansing." The severity of the conflict was pushed to the forefront of
international attention when the Commission on Human Rights con-
vened the first exceptional session in its history on August 13, 1992, to
"discuss reports of detention camps, arbitrary imprisonments and exe-
cutions, and destruction of homes and villages in the former Yugosla-
via.'
This extraordinary session of the Commission on Human Rights
was prompted by disturbing reports that many governments had re-
ceived concerning gross abuses of the human rights of Bosnian Mus-
lims by Serbs in direct contravention of international law. Most appall-
ing were reports of deliberate targeting of civilians, a grave breach of
the humanitarian law as set forth in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.5 The entire Bosnian population was suffering from bru-
tal Serbian pressures designed to create a Greater Serbia through the
policy of "ethnic cleansing."
Since his appointment by the Commission on Human Rights in
August 1992, the Special Rapporteur has issued four reports on the
human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia to the General As-
sembly and to the Security Council." These reports contain substan-
Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1992, at Al.
49. U.N. Doc. S/RES1/21 (1992).
50. United Nations Information Service, "Human Rights Commission Opens Ex-
ceptional Session on Situation in Yugoslavia," Press Release HR/3139, Aug. 13, 1992,
at 1.
51. See generally 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27.
52. U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Letter dated 5 August 1992
from the permanent representative of the U.S. of America to the United Nations
Office at Geneva Addressed to the Under-Secretary General for Human Rights, Re-
port on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia sub-
mitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human
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tial evidence detailing pervasive violations of international humanitar-
ian law, attributed mainly to the Serbian policies of "ethnic cleansing."
In his initial report of August 28, 1992, the Rapporteur indicated
that ethnic cleansing has been pursued openly throughout territory in
Bosnia-Herzegovina that was controlled by ethnic Serbs." In these
areas, grave breaches of international humanitarian law by local Serbs
included a raft of offenses: nighttime shooting at homes belonging to
other ethnic groups; forced displacement of Muslims from their homes;
armed attacks on churches and mosques; and the cutting off of food aid
and other supplies, including the use of direct attacks on humanitarian
aid personnel." Among the egregious violations of international hu-
manitarian law reported were the shelling of civilian population cen-
ters, the shooting of innocent civilians by snipers, and the detention of
civilians as a means to pressure them to leave the territory.' Evi-
dence also revealed that untold numbers of Muslim prisoners in
Bosnia-Herzegovina died of torture and systematic execution during
1992. Some three thousand disappearances were reported to have
occurred in the aftermath of the fall of the Bosnia city of Vukovar."
The second report by the Rapporteur was based on a visit to
Bosnia during October 1992."' Its conclusions were no less alarming
than those of the first investigation: serious violations of human rights
had intensified, and the indigenous Muslim population had clearly be-
come the principal victims of aggression." The situation of displaced
Rights, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Commission Resolution 1992/S-/l of 14 August
1992 [hereinafter First Report]; U.N. ESCOR, Commission of Human Rights, Letter
dated 5 Aug. 1992 from the permanent representative of the U.S. of America to the
United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the Under-Secretary General for Hu-
man Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia submitted by M. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission of Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Commission Resolution
1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1992/S-1/10 [hereinafter Second
Report]; U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia; Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 of Commission Resolution
1992/S-1/I and Economic and Social Council decision 1992/305, U.N. Doc. A/47/666-
S/24809 (1992) [hereinafter Third Report]; U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human
Rights, 49th Seas., Situation of human rights in the terriroty of the former Yugosla-
via, Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugosla-
via prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/S-Il of 14 August 1992,
U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1993/50 [hereinafter Fourth Report].
53. First Report, supra note 52, at 2.
54. Id. at 2-4.
55. Id. at 3-5.
56. Id. at 9, para. 41.
57. Second Report' supra note 52.
58. The Rapporteur averred:
Grave and massive violations of human rights continue to occur in the
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persons was becoming increasingly serious, particularly in Travnik
where the plight of some fourteen thousand refugees was being han-
dled by local authorities.' Before their arrival in Travnik, many of
these refugees had been taken to the front battle lines and subjected to
beatings, robbery, rape, and sometimes shooting.' Brutal methods
associated with ethnic cleansing had occurred in the Bosnian towns of
Pijavija, Prikepolje, and Pribj."1
The Third Report of the Special Rapporteur was issued on Novem-
ber 17, 1992 and specifically highlights violations of the various
parties' legal obligations under modern international humanitarian
law." In areas under Serbian control, the multifaceted process of eth-
nic cleansing was being systematically practiced to drive out Bosnian
Muslims from their homes, including widespread use of torture, artil-
lery shelling of civilian neighborhoods, and summary mass executions
- some of which claimed as many as five thousand victims.' The
Rapporteur asserted that ethnic cleansing was clearly following the
political objective by Serbian nationalists to gain control over all terri-
tories inhabited by significant numbers of Serbs, with the ultimate
goal of incorporating Serbian-occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina
into a "Greater Serbia.' The Third Report also underscored the hu-
manitarian crisis in the region. Out of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population
of four million, at least 1.5 million have become refugees and displaced
persons, with seventy five percent of the latter being children and the
elderly.'
The Fourth Report by the Special Rapporteur was the most com-
prehensive and concluded that massive violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law are not simply features of armed con-
flict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, such heinous means were being
used systematically and deliberately by Serbs to achieve ethnically
homogenous areas.' Ethnic cleansing had clearly been successful in
territory of the former Yugoslavia. The military conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is aimed at 'ethnic cleansing", remains a matter of
particular and most urgent concern .... [Hiuman rights violations
continue to be committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in certain
respects have intensified .... As indicated in the first report, the Mus-
lim population are the principal victims and are virtually threatened
with extermination.*
Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. To escape terrorist bombings and burning by paramilitary groups, an esti-
mated 70,000 Muslims were reported to have fled this region since June of 1991. Id.
at 6.
62. Third Report, supra note 52.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 6-7.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 6.
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obtaining its objectives: nearly two-thirds of Bosnia had been put un-
der Serbian control.' Summary executions, mass arrests and arbi-
trary detention, widespread rape, deprivation of children, forced trans-
fer of populations, attacks on civilian population centers, wanton de-
struction of property, and harassment of humanitarian relief convoys
have all been used by Serbs against Bosnians to achieve "ethnic
cleansing" in the region."
In Croatia, the Fourth Report indicated that discrimination had
occurred against Serbian civilians, particularly as regards their citizen-
ship and political rights.' In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
situation of human rights in Kosovo had deteriorated as discrimination
was intensifying by Serbs against the Albanian minority.0 As for the
Republic of Slovenia, the main pressures have come with the influx of
large numbers of refugees from Bosnia - at least 70,000 since June
1991.71 Macedonia, thus far, has managed to avoid becoming em-
broiled in the military conflict, although nearly 32,000 refugees have
fled there from Bosnia and Croatia.'
The conclusions of the Special Rapporteur are bold, stark, and
troubling: ethnic cleansing violates fundamental principles of inter-
national humanitarian law; evidence of war crimes during the conflict
in both Bosnia and Croatia is pervasive and growing; the rape of wom-
en, including minors, is widespread in both conflicts; and the "political
and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs bear the primary responsi-
bility for the ethnic cleansing policy carried out there in total disregard
of their obligations. However, with the prolongation of the conflict,
more and more atrocities are being committed by other parties. ""3
c. The Warburton Mission
The European Community sent an additional mission, headed by
Dame Ann Warburton, to investigate the treatment of Muslim women
in the former Yugoslavia. The mission spent two weeks in that territo-
ry - from December 18-24, 1992 and January 19-26, 1993 - and
issued a report to the U.N. Secretary-General on February 3, 1993.T'
The findings of this mission are profoundly disturbing. On the basis of
its investigations, the mission concluded that the rape of Muslim wom-
en has been perpetrated on a wide scale and in such a systematic,
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 6-24.
69. Id. at 26-30.
70. Id. at 34-39.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id. at 47-53.
73. Id. at 55-56.
74. European Community investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim wom-
en in the former Yugoslavia: Report to European Community Foreign Ministers, U.N.
Doc. S/25240, Annex I, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter Warburton Mission Report].
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premeditated manner as to be considered part of an intentional war
strategy. While the number of Muslim women raped during the conflict
will likely never be precisely known, the mission estimated that the
number of victims ranged between 10,000 and 60,000, with "the most
reasoned estimates" put at around 20,000."' The mission was not able
to gauge precisely how many women had become pregnant as a result
of rape, but one estimate suggested a possible figure of 1,000.76 Re-
garding the systematic nature of the rapes, the mission heard substan-
tial and compelling testimony that "a repeated feature of Serbian at-
tacks on Muslims towns and villages was the use of rape, often in
public, or the threat of rape, as a weapon of war to force the popula-
tion to leave their homes."" It became clear to the investigators that
rape was being used as "part of a pattern of abuse, usually perpetrated
with the conscious intention of demoralizing and terrorizing communi-
ties, driving them from their home regions and demonstrating the
power of the invading forces.'1 The Warburton report concluded,
therefore, that rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not incidental to the
main purpose of the aggression. Rather, it was being perpetrated as a
strategic purpose in itself. The type and scale of rapes reported to the
mission clearly suggested a deliberate pattern."
d. Conclusions
These abuses of human rights clearly constitute grave breaches of
international humanitarian law. This conclusion is patently obvious as
regards common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the
Laws of War, particularly as it relates to the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.' This pro-
vision protects the rights of civilians and others who are hors de com-
75. The report goes on to assert that:
The enormity of the suffering being inflicted on the civilian population
in this conflict defies expression. Indications are that at least some of
the rapes have been committed in particularly sadistic ways, so as to
inflict maximum humiliation on the victims, on their family and on the
whole community. In many cases there seems little doubt that the in-
tention is deliberately to make women pregnant and then to detain
them until pregnancy is far enough advanced to make termination im-
possible, as an additional form of humiliation and constant reminder of
the abuse done to them.
Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
79. Id. Subsequent investigations by the United Nations confirmed the use of
rape by the Serbs as a deliberate war weapon, but concluded there were only about
3000 victims. See Paul Lewis, Rape Was Weapon of Serbs, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 1993, at Al.
80. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27. See also supra text accompanying
note 28.
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bat in times of internal conflict, and it specifically prohibits violence to
life and person, the taking of hostages, inflicting degrading treatment
on an individual and conducting summary executions. In the same con-
nection, forced movements of civilian populations, in this case Bosnian
Muslims, are generally prohibited under international humanitarian
law as codified in Article 17 of the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Con-
ventions.81 That same instrument renders unlawful any acts of hostil-
ity directed against historic monuments or places of worship.'
It is also significant to realize that parties to the armed conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina are liable for breaches of the Programme of
Action on Humanitarian Issues adopted by them at London on August
27, 1992.8 Under this agreement, the parties agreed to respect the
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War and its two protocols, as
well as to hold responsible those persons who order or commit grave
breaches of them."
B. United Nations" Reactions
It is noteworthy that world public opinion manifested itself in a
principal organ of the United Nations, the Commission on Human
Rights. Asserting the rule of law as the basis for their deliberations
and decisions, the Commission demanded the cessation of these report-
ed violations and in effect upheld the relevance and importance of
international humanitarian law. The Commission in particular drew
upon the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and recom-
mended establishment of an International Humanitarian Fact-Finding
Commission."
The Security Council, concerned and alarmed over the increasing
reports of mass killings and ethnic cleansing, requested the Secretary
General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to analyze
such reports." In formulating this commission to investigate crimes
against the peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the Secu-
rity Council left open the possibility that the conclusions of this body
might well constitute the basis for "recommendations for further ap-
propriate steps.' This indeed proved to be the basis for creation of
the Balkans war crimes panel approved by the Security Council to
determine the liability of individuals accused of such crimes.
81. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 606, at art. 17.
82. Id. at art. 16.
83. See 1992 Programme of Action, supra note 35.
84. Id.
85. Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1992/S-2 of Dec. 1, 1992.
86. U.N. DOC. S/RES/780 (1992).
87. Id.
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The Security Council, by mandate of the U.N. Charter, plays the
critical role in maintaining international peace and security. Regarding
implementation of international humanitarian law for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Security Council has undertaken considerable effort
to demand respect for humanitarian law from all parties; to determine
that certain acts constitute violations of that body of law; to condemn
violations of certain humanitarian laws; and to request that govern-
ments take specific actions in reaction to those violations. The para-
mount realization becomes plain: the Security Council, as the principal
U.N. organ endowed with the responsibility for maintaining peace (un-
der Article 24 of the Charter), possesses the lawful capacity to demand
that grave breaches of international humanitarian law cease.' This
can be accomplished by determining the applicability of relevant hu-
manitarian instruments and by informing the international community
about the actual legal situation at issue.
This responsibility of the Security Council underpinned its cre-
ation of the Commission of Experts on October 6, 1992. The Council
specifically referenced provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
demanded that all parties "cease and desist from all breaches of inter-
national humanitarian law." Significantly, persistence of such grave
breaches would permit the Security Council to take further measures
against these violations. This explains why the fact-finding missions of
the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission, as well as
investigations by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
Conference on European Cooperation and Security, Human Rights
Watch (especially Helsinki Watch), Amnesty International, and other
human rights organizations have served as impressive supplements for
substantiating conclusions drawn by the Commission of Experts. Re-
ports and data from all these groups furnished vital ingredients in the
Security Council's deliberations."
Credible enforcement measures encourage respect and confidence
in institutions that contribute to participation of individuals in a
rights-based community. When applied to the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the sensible approach suggests that states and organiza-
tions should persist in their investigations of violations of human
rights. The war crimes tribunal must be made to work to ensure that
law upholds justice. The duty to investigate violations has been repeat-
edly stressed in international instruments, including the four 1949
Geneva Conventions," the Genocide Convention," the Convention
Prohibiting Torture," and the International Covenant on Civil and
88. See infra text accompanying notes 99-100.
89. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/780, at para. 2 (1992).
90. See Commission of Experts Report, supra note 1.
91. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, arts. 52, 53, 132, 149.
92. Genocide Convention, supra note 37, art. VIII.
93. Convention Against Torture, supra note 40, art. IO.
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Political Rights." Furthermore, Article IV of the Genocide Conven-
tion, Article 6(b) of the London Charter (1945), and Principle VI of the
Nuremberg Principles, adopted by General Assembly resolution 95(I)
in December 1946, affirm that violation of these laws is punishable.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
On February 22, 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 808 (1993), which formally decided that an international
tribunal should be established "for the prosecution of persons responsi-
ble for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
inthe territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."' Three months
later, on May 25, the Security Council adopted Resolution 827 (1993),
formally establishing such a tribunal." The creation of a tribunal to
investigate and prosecute war crimes during the armed conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia reaffirms the necessity of dealing with violations of
humanitarian law and the laws of war - particularly crimes against
civilians - and with individual penal liability of those responsible for
such violations.
The traditional objection to an international war crimes court
turned mainly on the presumption that such a tribunal would not be
capable of applying international laws of war to individual persons.
International law was deemed binding only on states per se, and hence
only a particular state could punish an individual offender. The
Nuremberg court and subsequent trial proceedings have rendered that
argument moot. That objection has been overtaken by the principle
that violations of the laws of war constitute both a national and an
international crime and are therefore justiciable both in a national or
international court. The new International Tribunal for dealing with
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia reaffirms the international com-
mitment to that principle.
A. Legitimacy of an International Criminal Tribunal
The legitimacy of creating an international tribunal for prosecut-
ing serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territo-
ry of the former Yugoslavia is predicated on the principle of nullum
crimen sin lege: there can be no punishment for a crime unless it has
been a priori defined by law." Justification for such a court has been
94. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 41.
95. U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, at para. 1 (1993).
96. U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
97. This criticism was leveled at the Nuremberg Trials, and in particular at the
charges of crimes against humanity that did not formally exist until expressly de-
fined in the Charter of the Military Tribunal. Even so, it is undeniable that most
crimes against humanity were also war crimes, committed in violation of the law of
belligerent occupation. See W'Aliam V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the
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fixed through the Nuremberg Precedent, indisputable norms of cus-
tomary international law, various international treaties, and resolu-
tions of the United Nations.
The legitimacy underpinning the International Tribunal for prose-
cuting war crimes in the former Yugoslavia will not be undercut by the
stigma of an institution created to mete out victors' justice. Interna-
tionalization of the prosecution and trial for both victims and accused
will work to ensure that impartial justice is rendered without interfer-
ence by any of the affected principal governments. In order to guaran-
tee such impartiality, the Tribunal is international in character, com-
position, and authority; it is endowed with multiple jurisdictions over
actions, persons, places, and time; and it avoids being transformed into
an unwieldy international bureaucracy.
At least three procedures for establishing the proposed tribunal
were available to the international community. First, an international
treaty might be concluded among concerned states. This was the
course followed for the Nuremberg Tribunal, and this route has also
been the means sought by the United Nations to establish a perma-
nent international criminal court. Serious disadvantages, however,
would likely encumber the treaty approach to creating an international
Balkans tribunal. Not least among these are difficulties associated
with concluding multilateral negotiations and the prolonged time re-
quired for governments to complete the signature, ratification, and
entry into force of the agreement. Even then, some states whose partic-
ipation is indispensable (e.g., the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Russia) might decide not to participate in the treaty arrangement.
A second approach would be for the United Nations itself to estab-
lish the tribunal. Clearly, as spelled out in the U.N. Charter, the orga-
nization enjoys competence in the field of human rights and has long
studied proposals for the establishment of an international criminal
court." Still, given the nature of United Nations debates in general,
and deliberations over an international criminal court in particular,
enthusiasm about the efficiency or eventual success of the U.N. ap-
proach can hardly be expected.
The most expeditious manner for establishing a war crimes panel
- and the approach taken through Security Council Resolutions 827
and 808 - is to have the Security Council create an ad hoc tribunal
designed specifically to prosecute accused perpetrators of atrocities in
Gulf War, 31 VA. J. INTL L. 391, 395 (1991).
98. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND
DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (2nd ed. 1987); BENJA-
MIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRnmAL COuRt. A STEP TOwARD WORLD PEACE:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1980); and M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christo-
pher Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New Interna-
tional World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992).
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the ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Security Council is
empowered to do so on the basis of the authority conferred to it in
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Article 39 provides that the Security
Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Under this mandate, the Council has the lawful authority to make a
determination that heinous war crimes and serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law committed during the armed conflicts in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia constitute threats to or breaches
of the peace. Such a tribunal is also necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security in the region. This approach is em-
braced in Security Council Resolutions 827 and 808.
Given its legal authority, the operative provision enabling the
Security Council to establish an ad hoc tribunal is found in Article 41
of the Charter, which provides the following:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations."
At first blush, the measures in Article 41 might appear far estranged
from the creation of a war crimes court. The point must be under-
scored, however, that this list is only illustrative of certain options,
and not inclusive of all measures that might be employed by the Secu-
rity Council. Clearly, the phrase declaring that the Security Council
may determine "what measures not involving the use of armed force" it
may wish to employ implicitly leaves open any available options. The
creation of an international tribunal stands as an appropriate measure
if such a court would contribute to attaining or facilitating the restora-
tion of international peace and security in the region. This fundamen-
tal premise provides the foundation for the Security Council's actions
in adopting Resolutions 827 and 808.
B. Competence of the International Tribunal
1. Lawful Authority
The Statute of the International Tribunal will govern the tribunal
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
100. Id. art. 41.
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and provide the framework for its deliberations." 1 A similar docu-
ment was drafted for the Nuremberg trials, and such a charter is criti-
cal for structuring the organization, responsibilities, and functions of
the tribunal.
The Secretary-General drafted specific language for the present
Statute, based on formulations for provisions found in existing interna-
tional instruments as well as from suggestions for draft articles re-
ceived from states, organizations, and individuals during 1992-
1993."~ The legal rationale for the Tribunal's creation and the expla-
nation of provisions comprising the Statute are contained in the "Re-
port of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)."1" In adopting Resolution 827, the Se-
curity Council approved this report, thereby creating the Tribunal and
adopting the language prepared by the Secretary-General.
In terms of international law, a critical consideration underpin-
ning the Balkans war crimes tribunal is that it has been established
by international authority and exercises a jurisdiction that is interna-
tionally conferred. This will entail enforcement of the laws of war
through military courts set up by the armed forces of the aggrieved
state, whose power of law enforcement stems from that state govern-
ment alone.
The International Tribunal established under U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 827 and 808 was adopted unanimously. Under the U.N.
Charter, to which 184 states are now party (including the Republic of
Yugoslavia [Serbia], Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia), member states
are bound in Article 24 to abide by substantive decisions adopted by
the Security Council.'" These Security Council decisions are legally
binding, authoritative, and controlling."° They carry the force of law.
Creation of the Balkans tribunal under that procedure, therefore, en-
dows that body with international legitimacy and authoritative juris-
diction.
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Now formally established, the International Tribunal is allocated
the legal competence to deal with designated crimes that are of an
101. The Statute of the International Tribunal is annexed to the Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), at 36 [hereinafter Statute of the International
Tribunal].
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
105. As substantiated in Article 25, "the Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter.* Id. art. 25.
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international character, perpetrated by certain persons, during a speci-
fied time period, in a given territory. In this respect, the competence of
this court flows from its Statute and its jurisdiction over criminal sub-
ject matter. Four clusters of crimes can be prosecuted under the Stat-
ute: (1) grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; (2) violations
of the laws or customs of war; (3) genocide; and (4) crimes against
humanity.
a. Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
The Tribunal has been given the competence to prosecute certain
punishable crimes, including those laid down by the Nuremberg Pre-
cedent, that protect persons under international humanitarian law.
Perhaps the clearest enumeration of these offenses is found in the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular common article
50/51130/147 of those instruments.1' This provision defines the
"grave breaches" of international humanitarian law that states are
required to punish and that are contiguous to the offenses contained in
Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions.1' Common article
50/51130/147 also prescribes minimum rules applicable to situations of
armed conflict that are not international in character.
The Statute of the International Tribunal incorporates the essen-
tial language of this common provision of "grave breaches" into Article
2, which gives the Tribunal power to prosecute persons "committing or
ordering to be committed" the following acts:
(a) willful killing-,
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces
106. As defined in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, certain "grave breaches"
are crimes committed against persons or property protected by the conventions and
include:
(a) Willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment of protected persons;
(b) Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or health of
protected persons;
(c) Taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,
(d) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected
person;
(e) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile power, and,
(f) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights
of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Geneva Conventions.
1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, arts. 50, 51, 130, 147.
107. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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of a hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.'u
Two notable improvements are made in Article 2 over the 1949
Geneva Conventions. First, in paragraph (b), "biological experiments"
have been specified as a form of prohibited "inhuman treatment." Sec-
ond, the language in the provision has been adjusted to replace the
notion of "protected persons" with a specific designation of "civilians."
In this way, commission of grave breaches of the laws of war are di-
rectly referenced to civilians under the Statute, regardless whether the
conflict is legally interpreted to be an internal or an international war.
b. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
Another important part of international humanitarian law is
found in the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and the regulations annexed thereto."°
While covering facets of international humanitarian law later incorpo-
rated into the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations im-
portantly stipulate that the right of belligerents to fight war is not
unlimited. Indeed, the rules of land warfare prohibit certain methods
of waging war. As prescribed in the Statute, persons may be
prosecuted for violating the laws or customs of war (as derived from
the Hague Regulations), including, but not restricted to, the following:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering,
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works or art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.1
The origin of these provisions lies in Articles 23-28 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations. These provisions are specifically intended to punish per-
sons who have engaged in indiscriminate bombardment of civilian
population centers without military need or justification.
108. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 2; cf. 1949 Geneva
Conventions, supra note 106, arts. 50, 51, 130, 147.
109. See Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 24.
110. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 3; see also Hague
Convention No. IV Annex (Regulations), supra note 24, arts. 23, 25, 27, 28.
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c. Genocide
Also, within the context of crimes committed within the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide directly relates to actions to be prosecuted by
the tribunal."' The Statute for the new court makes this plain, pro-
viding in Article 4 that the Tribunal will prosecute persons accused of
genocide. In this provision, genocide is defined as any of the following
acts, "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such":
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to an other group."2
In paragraph 3 of Article 4, the Statute stipulates that the following
acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity to commit genocide."
It is significant that these paragraphs in Article 4 of the Statute were
incorporated verbatim from Articles II and III, respectively, of the
1948 Genocide Convention. Much has been made about the incredible
violence directed specifically against the Muslim population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina - violence motivated principally by ethnic, cultural, and
religious heritage. Specific inclusion in the Statute for prosecution of
the crime of genocide is intended to redress such gross violations of
international humanitarian law.
d. Crimes Against Humanity
The Tribunal must address the most serious war crimes: those
that have been committed on a massive scale, in a systematic manner,
that cause acute revulsion, and make necessary a direct international
response. The Tribunal must assert its jurisdiction over cases that
allege crimes against humanity, for which there are no statutory limi-
tations. 4 As criminal conduct, such acts have their origins in the
111. Application of the Genocide Convention is warranted by the purposeful use of
.ethnic cleansing" to drive out Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
112. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 4, para. 2.
113. Id. art. 4, para. 3.
114. This is provided for in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
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Nuremberg Charter.11 Crimes against humanity are aimed at any
civilian population and are prohibited in armed conflict, regardless of
its international or internal character. The Statute acknowledges this
critical point in Article 5, then enumerates eight categories of specific
acts that will be treated as crimes against humanity by the Tribunal:
(1) murder; (2) extermination; (3) enslavement; (4) deportation; (5)
imprisonment; (6) torture; (7) rape; and (8) persecution on political,
racial or religious grounds. A ninth category, "other inhumane acts," is
included to make the list potentially all-inclusive.1 6
Crimes against humanity emanate from Article 6 of the 1945
Nuremberg Charter."' In the case of the former Yugoslavia, two new
acts have specifically been designated as crimes against humanity:
torture and rape. The heinousness and condemnation of acts of torture
finds expression in the 1984 Convention Against Torture, 8 which
now is in force and accepted as a peremptory norm in human rights
law. The crime of rape, the criminality of which largely was overlooked
in past wars, took on great urgency with the reported massive viola-
tions of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 and 1993. 9 By
designating rape as a crime against humanity, the criminality of the
act in international law has been spotlighted, and international con-
cern has been directly focused on the need to punish perpetrators.
A final point merits mention. The Balkan War Crimes Tribunal
will not specifically address crimes against the peace, i.e., it will not
prosecute persons for participation in planning and waging of a war of
aggression. Proving these allegations would be protracted and extraor-
dinarily difficult. The amount of documentation containing plans and
war strategies is unknown, and securing access to military and diplo-
matic records of the governments involved - especially the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (for Serbia), as well as Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina - would not come easy. Confirmation that all requested
documents have been duly turned over to court investigators is highly
unlikely from government leaders who themselves are likely to be the
targets of investigation. Such persons will not automatically escape
prosecution, however, since individual criminal responsibility is ac-
knowledged for planning gross violations of international humanitari-
an law.
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754
U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
116. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 5.
117. See supra text accompanying note 8.
118. Convention Against Torture, supra note 40.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
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3. Personal Jurisdiction
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is critical to the
function of the Tribunal. The Statute of the Tribunal addresses this
concern in Article 7, as it asserts that "a person who planned, instigat-
ed, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime."'
The war crimes court thus confronts the principle that individuals may
be held criminally liable under international law, even though their
conduct might have been considered valid or even mandated by domes-
tic law.
It will not be enough to enforce the laws of war only against ordi-
nary soldiers and officers of law of mid-level rank. The Tribunal's hand
of punishment must reach up to military elites and civilian govern-
ment officials. Article 7 of the Statute provides for such punishment:
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate pun-
ishment.
3. The fact that any of the [criminal] acts... of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.2
All persons who participate in the planning, preparation, or execution
of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia share in the commission of the crime and are therefore
individually responsible. The Tribunal will also hold that the principal
responsibility for war crimes pursuant to orders falls to those in au-
thority who gave the orders.
The Tribunal may find it difficult to draw a clear line between
war crimes proper and "crimes against humanity." It may also be dif-
ficult to set the precise scope of the latter.' In any event, it has be-
come a recognized precept of contemporary international law that
persons pledged to obey orders of their superiors, in particular those
issued by heads of state and governments, are held personally respon-
sible for acts committed by their subordinates.' The Statute of the
120. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 7, para. 1.
121. Id. art. 7, paras. 2, 3.
122. The law relating to war crimes is clear and has been set out in numerous
international law-making instruments. See Hague Convention IV, supra note 24, arts.
46, 50, 52, 56; 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 27, art. 3.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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Tribunal makes this clear and unambiguous.
This expansion of individual liability aims to reaffirm the princi-
ple that the laws of war and other rules of international humanitarian
law are superior to domestic law, and that individuals are accountable
to them. In contemporary international law, individuals have interna-
tional duties that transcend facets of national obedience required by a
particular state. Violation of international law in allegiance to national
law is a violation nonetheless; that circumstance can not remove the
stigma of contravention. Accordingly, persons who violate the laws of
war in the name of their state are no less accountable for their actions.
Indeed, the Tribunal implicitly embraces this point. Individuals who
violate international humanitarian law or the laws of war can not find
automatic immunity in the authority of national law or allegiance to
the state.
Establishment of the International Tribunal was not intended to
preclude the exercise of jurisdiction of national courts in the prosecu-
tion of persons responsible for serious violations of law committed
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The Statute
asserts that concurrent jurisdiction will exist between the Internation-
al Tribunal and national courts to prosecute such persons.u Even so,
to avoid complications arising from the principle of non-bis-in-idem
(i.e., a person may not be tried twice for the same crime), the Statute
asserts "primacy" over national courts. This means that the Tribunal
may request national courts to defer prosecution to the competence of
the International Tribunal.'
4. Territorial and Temporal Jurisdiction
The competence of the Tribunal has also been fixed in terms of
territorial and temporal jurisdiction. Regarding the scope of the Inter-
national Tribunal's territorial jurisdiction, the territory of the former
Yugoslavia is construed to mean that of "the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace and terri-
torial waters."' The Tribunal's jurisdiction will extend only to acts
that have been committed by persons since the dissolution of the for-
mer Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which precipitated the
outbreak of hostilities in the region. The Secretary-General decided to
fix to begin the precise date for violations to begin on or after January
1, 1991, a neutral date not linked to any specific event.27
124. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 9, para. 1.
125. Id. art. 9, para. 2.
126. Id. art. 8.
127. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. DOC. S/25704 (3 May 1993), at 16; Statute of the Inter-
national Tribunal, supra note 101, at art. 8. Other commentators suggested the
beginning date for violations as June 1, 1991, the month that Croatia and Slovenia
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C. Composition of the Tribunal
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is interna-
tional in character. As a result, single-nation courts are welcome but
insufficient for issuing authoritative interpretations of international
law and for establishing international jurisdiction and operable admin-
istrative procedures that might permit international penal law to func-
tion satisfactorily. The Statute provides for concurrent jurisdiction
with national courts; in cases where jurisdiction overlaps, however,
primacy is reserved for the International Tribunal.
The International Tribunal consists of three main organs: (1) the
Chambers, comprised of two Trial Chambers and one Appeals Cham-
ber; (2) the Prosecutor; and (3) the Registry.
1. The Chambers
The organization of the Tribunal reflects its intended functions.
There are to be eleven independent judges, no two of whom are nation-
als of the same state. Three judges serve in each of the two Trial
Chambers, and five judges serve in the Appeals Chamber.'
Judges on the Tribunal must be qualified in international law,
international criminal law, and have a special appreciation for human
rights law. In the language of the Statute, judges must be "persons of
high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the quali-
fications required in their respective countries for appointment to the
highest judicial offices."' They should also be representative of the
principal legal systems of the world. Unlike the Nuremberg court,
which had representatives only from France, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and the United Kingdom (the four victorious powers of
World War II), the Balkans tribunal will reflect a multinational,
multicultural composition.
A critical necessity is that judges selected for the Tribunal be
considered without dispute and reservation legitimate representatives
formally proclaimed their independence from Yugoslavia. See Chuck Sudetic, 2 Yugo-
slav States Vote Independence to Press Demands, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at Al.
128. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 12. In its formal
proposal to the U.N. Secretary-General, France suggested fifteen judges appointed by
the Security Council to serve on the Tribunal. Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from
the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25266 (1993), at 60 [hereinafter French Tribunal Proposal].
The United States proposed that eighteen judges be selected, nine for the Tribunal
and nine for an appeals court. Letter Dated 5 April 1993 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the United States to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-Gener-
al, U.N. DOC. S/25575 (1993), UNITED NATIONS, CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAw IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, at 1 (art. 2.) [mimeographed].
129. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 13, para. 1.
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to the court.' This is assured through the procedure of their election
by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security
Council."' As formally set out, the Secretary-General invites nomina-
tions for candidates from member states in the United Nations as well
as from non-member states maintaining permanent observer missions
at U.N. Headquarters. Those nominations are forwarded to the Securi-
ty Council, which then composes from them a list of at least twenty
two, but no more than thirty three, candidates. That list of candidates
is then forwarded to the General Assembly, which elects by absolute
majority eleven judges to serve on the Tribunal. Judges serve a term of
four years, and are eligible for re-election."" Judges are also made
responsible for drafting and adopting rules of evidence and procedure
that the Tribunal will use in the pre-trial phase of its proceedings as
well as in the conduct of trials and appeals, the admission of evidence,
and the protection of victims and witnesses.'
2. The Prosecutor
An independent Prosecutor is to be entrusted with the responsibil-
ity of conducting investigations and prosecutions of persons alleged to
have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991."
The need for such an office is clear. The Tribunal is endowed with
sufficient powers as necessary and appropriate to conduct criminal
trials and appeals. These powers, which are spelled out clearly in the
Statute establishing the Tribunal's authoritative legal competence,
include the powers to issue arrest warrants, to summon and question
130. One proposal to ensure this precondition would have had existing interna-
tional jurisdictions elect from the ranks of their sitting or former members persons
to serve on the Tribunal. International juridical bodies that offered well-established
guarantees of impartiality would have included the International Court of Justice,
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
and the African Commission of Human Rights. See French Tribunal Proposal, supra
note 128, at 45.
131. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 13, para. 2.
132. Id. art. 13. On September 17, 1993, the U.N. General Assembly selected the
eleven judges to serve on the Balkans tribunal. They are Elizabeth Odio Benito
(Costa Rica), Jules Deschenes (Canada), Antonio Cassese (Italy), Georges Michel
Abisaab (Egypt), Li Haopel (China), Germain le Foyer de Costil (France), Lal Chand
Vohrah (Malaysia), Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia),
Adophus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), and Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (United
States). Significantly, none of the judges is Muslim, although judges were selected
from three Muslim states - Pakistan, Egypt, and Malaysia. War Crimes Judges
Named, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at 18.
133. Id. art. 15. Such rules of evidence and procedure have recently been pro-
mulgated to guide the investigation and prosecution of alleged offenders. See Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32, Mar. 14, 1994.
134. Id. art. 16.
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witnesses, to require submission of documents and evidentiary mate-
rials, to administer oaths to witnesses, and to conduct appropriate
proceedings aimed at securing evidence. Concerning the intricate de-
tails of juridical functions, certain fundamental questions must be ad-
dressed in prosecuting each case:
(1) What is the offense that is alleged?
(2) Can the offender(s) be identified?
(3) To what degree was the accused offender responsible?
(4) Was the offense committed on the offender's own initiative, or in
obedience to orders?
(5) What evidence is available to support the charge?
(6) What will be a probable defense?
(7) Can an offender be put on trial with reasonable expectation of con-
viction?
Depending on the number of cases to be handled by the Tribunal,
these queries are neither insignificant in scope nor potty in substance.
The role of the Prosecutor becomes essential for transforming these
queries into a prosecutable case.
Prior to trial before a Chamber of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor
will undertake preparatory work relating to cases submitted for trial.
The Prosecutor's staff will work to gather facts and evidence, facilitate
examination of individual cases submitted by investigators, and com-
pile lists of accused war criminals. The purpose of this special
Prosecutor's office is to determine whether ex parte material submitted
for prosecution is sufficient to disclose a prima facie case. Such a pros-
ecutorial staff does not have juridical functions; rather it operates
more in the manner of a grand jury. The notion of "independence" here
is critical; the Prosecutor should neither seek nor receive instructions
from any government or other source.M
Regarding case preparation, this investigatory body must confirm
evidence already gathered and seek further evidence for and against
the accused. Toward this end, several investigatory measures will have
to be undertaken, including, inter alia, questioning the accused, ob-
taining testimony from victims and witnesses, confronting witnesses
and taking depositions, compiling written and other documentary evi-
dence, and conducting visits to crime scenes. These measures are pre-
scribed in the Statute.13
The Prosecutor will have to rely on the good faith, accuracy, and
135. Id. art. 16, para. 2.
136. Id. art. 18.
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diligence of investigators in presenting cases involving actual viola-
tions of the laws of war. In examining whether prima facie evidence
existed in each instance, the investigatory-prosecution staff must ex-
amine the charges to determine, first, whether there had been a viola-
tion of international humanitarian law and, second, whether there
existed sufficient facts to constitute violation of that law. In these
regards, certain critical questions must be addressed by investigators:
(1) Do the charges made disclose the existence of a violation of human-
itarian law?; (2) Does sufficient evidence exist to identify an alleged
offender?; and (3) Does a good reason exist for assuming that, if
prosecuted, an alleged offender would be convicted? Negative answers
to any of these questions might be sufficient cause for dismissal of a
case.
Once an investigation has been completed, at least three options
are available for each case. First, a case can be dismissed on grounds
of insufficient evidence. Second, a case can be turned over to an appro-
priate national court if the offenses of an accused defendant are deter-
mined to be less than those within the Tribunal's competence. Third, a
case can be transmitted for review to a judge of a Trial Chamber in the
form of an indictment that specifies the particular charges."1 If that
judge confirms the indictment, the judge then issues, at the request of
the Prosecutor's office, the necessary orders and warrants for the ar-
rest, detention, surrender, or transfer of that person so that a trial can
be conducted.'
3. Trial Proceedings
There is little doubt that it will be difficult to secure physical
jurisdiction over certain persons, particularly high government officials
accused of committing or ordering indictable offenses. This opens up
consideration for the possibility of trials being conducted against ac-
cused offenders in their absence. The Statute of the Tribunal, however,
clearly rejects this possibility. A trial can not begin until the accused is
physically present before the court.'"
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 19.
139. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 21, para. 4(d).
This requirement avoids the controversial possibility that persons might be tried in
absentia. While not desirable, trials in absentia reflect political realities of the situa-
tion. Even so, the option for such trials and details of undertaking that procedure
were rejected by the Secretary-General in favor of the requirement for having a
defendant present so that fairness of proceedings can not be impugned. Id. at art.
26, para. 101.
The argument supporting trials in absentia is understandable: Persons who have
been indicted, but who managed to avoid apprehension, would be made subject to
justice under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Guilty defendants would be made
susceptible to apprehension, arrest, prosecution, and punishment by all governments,
and extradition could be performed back to the Tribunal or the properly designated
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Under the Tribunal's Statute, the accused are guaranteed certain
internationally recognized rights and standards, as contained in Arti-
cle 14 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights."4 The Statute incorporates those rights of the accused in
Article 21 as four fundamental rights of all persons: (1) to be equal
before the Tribunal; (2) to be entitled to a fair and public hearing; (3)
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; and (4) to be entitled to
minimum guarantees. The minimum rights guaranteed to defendants
are as follows: (a) to be informed promptly and in a comprehensible
language of the nature of the charge; (b) to have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defense; (c) to be tried without un-
due delay; (d) to be tried in his own presence and to defend himself in
his own person or through legal assistance if unable to afford payment;
(e) to examine witnesses against him; (f) to have the free assistance of
an interpreter; and (g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or
confess guilt."' Similarly, given the nature of the crimes committed
in the former Yugoslavia, especially in cases of rape and sexual as-
sault, the Statute mandates that victims and witnesses must be pro-
tected, including in camera proceedings and protection of a victim's
identity.14
4. Judgment and Appeal
The Trial Chambers are given the authority to pronounce judg-
ment and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of viola-
tions of humanitarian law and the laws of war. A judgment is ren-
dered by a majority of the judges in a Chamber and publicly delivered
by written opinion.1' Significantly, unlike Nuremberg, penalties are
limited to imprisonment. The International Tribunal is not authorized
national authority after the court has been disbanded. In addition, under the 1951
Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, which has some 111 parties, including
the former Yugoslavia, parties are prohibited from granting refugee status to any
person when serious grounds exist for believing that person "has committed a crime
against the peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes."
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(F), 189 U.N.T.S.
150. This provision further erodes the possibility that an accused defendant might be
granted asylum by some government on grounds of the political offenses exception.
As a consequence, guilty verdicts by the Tribunal would leave in absentia offenders
isolated in their states, susceptible to extradition and trial once they travel abroad.
Guilty verdicts might also serve as particular deterrents to government officials and
military personnel elsewhere who come to contemplate similar genocidal atrocities
against civilians.
These arguments aside, as prescribed by the Statute, the International Tribu-
nal will not conduct such trials in the physical absence of a defendant.
140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 14.
141. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, art. 21.
142. Id. art. 22.
143. Id. art. 23.
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to issue the death penalty to convicted persons.'M Obviously, any
judgment rendered by the Tribunal must be done in accordance with
the general principles of international law."
To ensure the basic norms of due process, the right of defendants
to appeal to an independent appellate panel is included. The Statute
establishes an Appeals Chamber comprised of five judges.' This
court will hear appeals from a person convicted by the Trial Chambers
on grounds that the Trial Court committed an error of law that invali-
dates the decision or that an error of fact occurred that caused a mis-
carriage of justice. 4 Enforcement of sentences will be done by states
that indicate their willingness to do so to the Security Council. En-
forcement will be done in accordance with the domestic laws of those
states, outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Establishment of the International Tribunal by the Security Coun-
cil on the basis of a Chapter VII decision is sufficient to create the
obligation for U.N. member states to cooperate in implementing that
decision. Member governments are therefore expected to cooperate
with the International Tribunal in gathering evidence, locating wit-
nesses and suspects, identifying persons, and servicing documents such
as arrest warrants, search warrants, and surrender warrants. In this
connection, states are expected to surrender or transfer those persons
indicted and ordered for trial by a Trial Chamber.1"
5. Other Considerations
Four final administrative points are worth noting. First, the Stat-
ute provides for the establishment of a special Registry to service the
International Tribunal. This organ, headed by a Registrar, will be
responsible for such functions as providing public information, record-
ing the proceedings, printing and publishing documents, administering
budgetary and personnel matters, and serving as the communications
channel for the Tribunal.1"' Second, funding for the Tribunal can not
help but complicate the United Nations's tight budgetary situation.
Nevertheless, since the Tribunal is considered a subsidiary appendage
of the United Nations, its activities will be financed out of the regular
United Nations' budget, in line with Article 17 of the U.N. Charter 5°
144. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
145. London Charter, supra note 5, art. 26.
146. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, arts. 12, 25.
147. Id. art. 25, para. 1.
148. Id. art. 29.
149. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 101, at 23, art. 17.
150. Id. art. 32. If, however, the Tribunal had been considered part of a Security
Council peacekeeping operation, created under Chapter VII of the Charter, financing
might have been performed through a weighted scale of contributions from U.N.
Security Council members. The possibly also existed of soliciting voluntary contribu-
tions from member states for the Tribunars activities.
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Third, the site most likely for the International Tribunal is in the
Hague, Netherlands."' Fourth, the Tribunal's working languages will
be English and French."-
V. THE BALANCE SHEET
Law consists of rules for determining conduct and is the servant
of its creators. The function of law must be derivative, not overbearing.
While law strives for standards of responsibility, those standards must
be fixed with due regard to the demands of justice. Similarly, a rela-
tionship exists between legal norms and humanitarian values, though
that relationship is sometimes skewed by political interests. Legal
norms rest in the body of humanitarian law fashioned for the most
part during this century. International law becomes a definite and
positive reality, both in character and consequences, when competent
courts acting under legal sanction prosecute persons and sentence
them to punishments that are carried out by competent authorities.
There exists under contemporary international law a principle of indi-
vidual liability. In ordinary war crimes, those who carry out unlawful
acts are personally liable. No moral or logical justification exists for
applying different rules in the case of generalized crimes charged
against leaders of unjust belligerent states.
Establishment of the International Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia offers a signal opportunity for the contemporary law of armed
conflict: the international community has the potential to reassert an
international jurisdiction for the development of the international
penal law of war, to reaffirm compellingly the individual's obligation to
comply with internationally recognized standards of conduct, to re-
awaken application of law prohibiting war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity, and to expand considerably the individual's
criminal liability for violations of the laws of war.
The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also holds
the potential to reaffirm the sense of moral and political purpose that
underpins the laws of war. Since the Nuremberg trials, prosecution of
violations of the laws of war have been mainly cloistered in little-publi-
cized, national court-martial proceedings. The new Tribunal offers the
opportunity to bring to justice accused persons of all the warring fac-
tions, of all ranks - from the partisan irregular, to the lowly army
private, to commanding military officers and high government officials.
In these regards, it is imperative that the Tribunal not be used as
a bargaining chip in the diplomatic dealing aimed at bringing about an
end to the conflict. The Balkans war crimes panel appears principally
aimed against the Serbs, since the evidence overwhelmingly indicates
151. Id. art. 31.
152. Id. art. 33.
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most human rights abuses have been perpetrated by partisan Serb
forces. It would be wrong to trade away the Tribunal's proceedings in
exchange for Serbian concessions in negotiations for bringing about an
end to the hostilities. Resort to brutal, unlawful means to accomplish
an unlawful geopolitical end should not be rewarded by casting aside
the institutional means for obtaining just restitution under interna-
tional law.
The laws of war, long established and well recognized by states,
remain blurred around the margins. Their enforcement is sporadic and
often susceptible to change given rapid development in the circum-
stances and technology of warfare. In part this is attributable to the
customary nature of the laws of war and to the lack of any authorita-
tive source or systematic means of enforcement. There is no standing
legislature to prescribe an authoritative text of the rules, there is no
standing court to deal with transnational violations, and there are no
universally prescribed penalties for violations. In sum, the laws of war
are earmarked by amorphous, shifting qualities that comport with the
nature of war itself.
The lex lata in international human rights law has evolved from
such sources or dictates of public conscience and laws of humanity.
The linkage between the Nuremberg Precedent, international humani-
tarian law, and the broad body of human rights law must not go unap-
preciated. For in truth the Nuremberg principles remain a challenge to
governments and elites who systematically violate the laws of war and
fundamental principles of human rights. In a statist system earmarked
by considerations of sovereignty, the legal situation must be recast into
an international community that seeks to attain a higher legal order
- one in which the rule of law is more humane, more just, and more
acutely conscious of its place in regulating, punishing, and being more
committed to preventing violence and conflict. The tragic armed con-
flict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia offers a proving ground
for reviving the relevance of the Nuremberg Precedent and its atten-
dant legal principles for modern international law.
The process to codify human rights norms has obtained a sense of
legitimacy, especially over the last five decades. This applies to inter-
national humanitarian law, which also provides for the protection of
basic individual and collective human rights. In essence, the manner
in which the legal structure has developed makes it politically more
costly for states and individuals to suppress human rights and to vio-
late principles of international humanitarian law. Justice remains a
cherished concept; demonstrating respect for victims of human rights
abuses ranks among the most visible manifestations of that justice.
The keystone for making this respect real is the availability of credible
sanctions to punish violators. It is here especially that the Internation-
al Tribunal for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia takes on
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landmark significance.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
It is widely believed today that persons in the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in particular, the Republic of Serbia)
are guilty of committing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity. There is no question that the state, as a juridical person
under international law, is responsible for crimes committed by per-
sons in its government and armed forces against peoples in other
states. Furthermore, given the record at Nuremberg, no doubt exists
that Serbia's government leaders, civilian elites, military officers, and
enlisted personnel could be made personally liable to trial and punish-
ment by an international tribunal if evidence intimates that they or-
dered, participated in, or failed to halt the commission of these crimes.
Violation of the laws of war on orders of a government or an individual
military commander does not remove the stigma of a war crime from
that act. Acting on superior orders no longer constitutes a valid de-
fense for an individual accused of committing a war crime. These prop-
ositions entail what has become known in international law as the
"Nuremberg Precedent."
International law is partially a product of natural law. It has
grown and developed from workings of moral impulses and needs of
humankind through a quasi-instinctive evolution, as well as by de-
crees, authoritative pronouncements, and treaty agreements. Interna-
tional law in general, and the law of Nuremberg in particular, takes
shape and definition when such law is recognized by common consen-
sus of the international community and administered and enforced by
competent courts.
The case of prosecuting persons responsible for committing atroci-
ties in the territory of the former Yugoslavia highlights this funda-
mental obligation to obtain justice for wrongs inflicted upon the inno-
cent. A principal duty exists therefore for states, international organi-
zations, and individuals to work within the framework of an interna-
tional legal regime.
For the armed conflicts ongoing in the Balkans, that legal regime
takes the form of a competent court to prosecute and punish persons
who have grossly committed violations of international humanitarian
law. Only in this manner can credibility be restored to the Nuremberg
principles. Only in this manner can just restitution be made to redress
the pervasive suffering caused by brutal violations of fundamental
human rights throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only in this manner
153. Compare with the argument advanced by James C. O'Brien, The Internation-
al Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugosla-
via, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 639 (1993).
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can international humanitarian law obtain sufficient legal integrity in
the post-Cold War era to render it politically effective as a deterrent
against future depredations of fundamental human rights during situ-
ations of armed conflict.
